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More than eleven years have passed since California voters 
approved Proposition 13 in June 1978. That once-calamitous 
change in the way California's local governments are financed 
is now fully implemented and, for many, is the only property 
tax system they have ever known. 
Proposition 13 has given rise to several significant court 
decisions over the last decade, some of which remolded the 
shape of the initiative in important areas. However, since the 
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
initiative in the landmark Amador Vall~ decision in 1979, no 
lawsuits have attempted a fundamental challenge to 
Proposition 13. 
Current Court Challenges to Proposition 13 
In 1989, however, two groups of lawsuits have emerged 
which, if successful, could shake the foundation of Proposition 
13. One set of three cases seeks to overturn the assessment 
provisions of Proposition 13. These provisions limit the 




held by the current owner, allowing market value reappraisals 
only at time of ownership change or new construction. This 
results in large variations in tax liability of similar 
properties. Three different plaintiffs are challenging this 
feature of Proposition 13 as a violation of equal protection 
guarantees. The lawsuits were prompted by a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in a West Virginia property tax case handed down 
earlier this year. 
A second set of three cases challenges Proposition 13's 
statutory allocation of property tax proceeds among local 
government agencies. Known as AB 8, this statute distributes 
the proceeds of the local property tax among cities, counties 
and districts by a complex formula. Several local government 
agencies are challenging this formula system, arguing that it 
unfairly and improperly shifts tax revenues away from some 
local governments to the benefit of others. 
Five of the lawsuits currently are at the Superior Court 
level, and one is on appeal. If any of them were to be 
ultimately successful, they would seriously disrupt the 
financing of local government in California· and would produce 
much uncertainty and confusion while the Legislature sought 




Purpose of This Briefing Book 
This briefing book is designed to provide background 
materials for Legislators and interested parties as part of an 
interim hearing of the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee 
entitled "Current Court Challenges to the Constitutionality of 
Proposition 13 and Its Implementing Laws." The purpose of the 
hearing is to inform members and the public of the existence 
and status of these lawsuits, and to introduce them to the 
arguments made by those who seek to overturn aspects of current 
law and those who seek to defend current law. 
Chapter 1 provides background on the property assessment 
provisions of Proposition 13, and summarizes the three lawsuits 
which challenge the validity of the assessment features of 
Proposition 13. Chapter 2 covers the history of the property 
tax allocation statutes and summarizes the three lawsuits in 
this area. The pink pages following this Preface present 
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Challenges to AB 8's Allocation Method 
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might indicate how the courts will regard these attempts to 
invalidate AB 8? 




QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 
3) If one of these cases should be successful, what are the 
statewide implications? 
4) How are the plaintiffs' arguments affected by provisions 
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property tax allocations to no- and low-property-tax cities? 
5) What is the present status of these cases, and why have they 
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asking for changes only in the allocation of future property 
tax revenues 1 or are they also asking for retroactive 










As a prelude to this discussion of current court challenges 
to Proposition 13, it may be helpful to touch briefly on the 
fundamentals of property taxation in California. 
The property tax is the major general revenue source for 
local agencies in California. It is imposed on the owners of 
property in proportion to the assessed value of the property 
and applies to all classes of property. 
For purposes of taxation, property is divided into two 
categories: real property and personal property. Real 
property is land, permanently attached improvements, fixtures, 
and mineral rights. Personal property consists of movable 
property such as equipment, vessels, aircraft, and the like. 
Real and personal property can be either locally-assessed or 
state-assessed. 
Article XIIIA, added to the California Constitution in 1978 
by Proposition 13, revolutionized property taxation in 
California by changing both the tax rate and method of 
assessment. However 1 Chapter 1 exclusively examines current 
court challenges to Proposition 13's assessment provision and 
covers only locally-assessed real property. 
Background: Assessment Before Proposition 13 
Prior to Proposition 13, assessments for both real and 






"full cash value" of property, i.e., the price knowledgeable 
and willing buyers and sellers would agree upon for such a 
property, given its highest and best use. 
Although the assessor of each county had the constitutional 
mandate to annually assess all property subject to taxation by 
the March 1 lien date, fiscal and staffing constraints 
prohibited the assessor from physically reappraising all 
properties each year. Consequently, reappraisals would be 
conducted in certain geographic areas on a periodic, cyclical 
basis of every three to seven years. Between physical 
reappraisals, assessors would often apply interim value 
increases based on trending factors. 
Except for preferentially-assessed property, (e.g., open 
space, agricultural land, and qualifying timberland), there was 
no limitation on the amount of value added to the roll when a 
property was reassessed to market value. 
In summary, under the pre-Proposition 13 system, properties 
of similar market value generally received similar assessments. 
Progosition 13's Assessment System 
Proposition 13 drastically altered the way real property 
was assessed in California. It changed California's method of 
assessment from one based on a property's current market value 
to one based on so-called "acquisition value." 
For purposes of transition from one system to another, 




fair market value. Properties which have not sold or undergone 
new construction since 1975-76 are said to have a 1975-76 base 
year value. 
Proposition 13 requires county assessors to adjust a 
property's base year value upward each year to reflect 
inflationary increases, but it caps this annual reassessment at 
2%. Consequently, the only two instances in which a property 
can be reassessed upwards by more than 2% per year is upon a 
change in ownership or new construction. 
When a property is sold or transferred, or any other kind 
of change in ownership occurs, the property is reassessed to 
current fair market or ''acquisition~ value as of the date of 
the transfer. Newly constructed property (which can be 
property built from the ground up or an addition to existing 
property) is also assessed at current fair market value as of 
the date of completion. Once a property is reassessed upward 
upon completion or change in ownership, it is said to have an 
"adjusted base year value." A property can have multiple base 
year values due to new construction until the whole property 
changes ownership, when it will be assigned a new base year 
value based on its total fair market value at the time of sale. 
(Some forms of new construction or changes in ownership are 
exempt from reassessment. These include intrafamily transfers, 
replacement of senior citizens' residences, replacement of 





It should be noted also that Proposition 13's assessment 
provisions affected only locally-assessed real property; 
state-assessed utilities and locally-assessed personal property 
are subject to the valuation rules which were in effect prior 
to Proposition 13. Moreover, all pre-Proposition 13 property 
tax exemptions (e.g., for open space, agricultural land, etc.) 
remain in effect. 
Consequently, under Proposition 13, properties with similar 
fair market values can have widely disparate tax bills. It is 
quite common for two neighbors living in identical homes to 
have entirely different tax assessments. Table 1 at the end of 
this chapter illustrates how a home is assessed under 
Proposition 13. 
Previous Relevant Court Cases 
&T.ador Valley (1979). Opponents of Proposition 13 
wasted little time in challenging the constitutionality of 
the initiative. In Amador Valley Joint Union High School 
District v. State Board of Equalization, attorneys for the 
plaintiff argued that Proposition 13: 
a) Was a revision of, and not an amendment to, the 
Constitution and therefore could not be adopted through 
the initiative process; 
b) Violated the single-subject and summary of purpose 
requirements of the Constitution; 




d) Impaired the constitutional right to travel; 
e) Would result· in impairment of contracts; and 
f) Was void for vagueness. 
By a six to one vote, the California Supreme Court 
dismissed all challenges, including the crucial equal 
protection test. Writing for the majority, Justice J. 
Richardson opined: 
We cannot say that the acquisition value 
approach incorporated in article XIII A, by 
which a property owner's tax liability bears a 
reasonable relation to his costs of acquisition, 
is wholly arbitrary or irrational. Accordingly, 
the measure under scrutiny herein meets the 
demands of equal protection principles. 
Dissenting from this position, Chief Justice Rose Bird 
argued that: 
The basic problem with this position is that it 
upholds the adoption of an assessment scheme 
that systematically assigns different values to 
property of equal worth. 
Because this California Supreme Court decision was not 
appealed, it remains the highest judicial ruling on the 
constitutionality of Proposition 13. 
Allegheny (1989). In January of this year the United 
States Supreme Court rekindled the debate over the 





Virginia property tax case, Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal 
Company v. County Commission of Webster County, that the 
county's method of taxation violated the equal protection 
clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
On its face, Webster County's method of taxation appears 
very similar to that of Proposition 13. The Webster County 
tax assessor valued real property on the basis of its 
recent purchase price but made only minor, periodic 
adjustments in the assessments of land that had not been 
recently sold. 
The Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Company and several other 
coal companies brought suit against Webster County, 
claiming that the assessed values of their properties were 
as much as 35 times higher than the assessed values of 
comparable neighboring properties. 
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded unanimously that this 
practice denied the plaintiffs equal protection of the law 
because it "resulted in gross disparities in the assessed 
value of generally comparable property." Recognizing that 
its opinion could be construed to directly affect 
California's Proposition 13, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the Court, noted in a footnote: 
We need not and do not decide today whether the 
Webster County assessment method would stand on 
a different footing if it were the law of a 




aberrational enforcement policy it appears to 
be. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist subsequently made a direc 
reference to Proposition 13, leaving little doubt that the 
Court's opinion purposefully avoided addressing the 
question of the constitutionality of the California 
initiative. Rather, the Court's decision seemed to set the 
stage for a later resolution of that issue. 
Nevertheless, the similarities between California's and 
Webster County's method of assessment have led some to 
conclude thaL if brougl1t before the u.s. Supreme Court, 
Proposition 13 would be invalidated. 
Assessment Cases Filed In California This Year 
Seizing the Court's apparent invitation in Allegheny 1 
taxpayers have so far filed three cases in California this 
challenging Proposition 13's assessment provisions. 
Though the facts in each case vary, all of them challenge 
Proposition 13's provision which requires increased assessment 
of property when a change in ownership occurs. All claim that 
Proposition 13 violates the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution. 
Below is a brief description of each of the three cases. 
1) Northwest Financial v. State Board of Equalization and 
San Diego County 






horne in La Jolla, California on Novenilier 30, 1987 for 
$730,000. Shortly thereafter, the property was 
reassessed up to its purchase price, representing 
market value. 
The company filed suit on April 12, 1989, claiming 
that Proposition 13 is "invidiously discriminatory" 
and violates the equal protection clause of the U.S . 
Constitution. The suit argues that the property's 
current tax base of $730,000 is approximately four 
times higher than its base under the previous owner. 
The property's previous base was $175,839. The 
plaintiff is asking for a refund of property taxes. 
Although the case was dismissed by the San Diego 
County Superior Court on September 14, plaintiffs plan 
to file an appeal. 
2) Nordlinger v. Lynch 
Stephanie Nordlinger, a Los Angeles County 
resident, filed suit against John J. Lynch, Los 
Angeles County tax assessor on September 28, 1989 . 
Like Northwest Financial, Nordlinger is challenging 
the increased market value assessment of her property 
which took place when the change in ownership 
occurred. 
The suit details the property tax disparity between 
Nordlinger's property and similarly situated 




areas of California, the suit claims, there is as much 
as a 15 to 1 disparity in property assessments of 
properties with similar fair market values. 
Nordlinger is asking the Los Angeles County 
Superior Court to declare Proposition l3's assessment 
provisions and the tax assessment of her property 
invalid. 
Arguments in the case have not been heard. 
3) R. H. Macy & Co., Inc,, et. al. v. Contra Costa Co~nty 
R. H. Macy & Co., a Delaware Corporation, is a 
large retailer which owns a store in the Sun ley 
Mall in Concord, a city in Contra Costa County. 
R. H. Macy's predecessor underwent a corporate 
restructuring in 1986, it constituted a change 
ownership under Proposition 13. Consequently, the 
county assessor reassessed its department store to 
fair market value. 
R. H. Macy claims that this reassessment increased 
its property tax bill by more than 250%. 
the suit alleges that Macy·s paid approximate 2.5 
times more in property taxes than either J. C. 
Penney's or Sears which own comparable property in the 
same mall. 
Unique in this suit is the use of a detailed, 
computerized statistical study which shows both the 





by changes in ownership in Contra Costa County after 
1975. 
One study was of properties that were on both the 
1975 and 1987 rolls. According to the plaintiff's 
Complaint, this study revealed that 75% of commercial 
properties and 57% of residential properties retained 
their 1975 base year value on the 1987 assessment 
roll. As can be expected, the plaintiff and defendant 
differ on the interpretation of these statistics. 
Plaintiff is asking the Contra Costa County 
Superior Court to do the following: 
a. Declare Proposition· 13 unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied; 
b. Declare increased change in ownership 
assessments imposed on Macy's or any of its 
subsidiaries void; 
c. Order that such assessments and taxes must be 
based on the 1975 base year value; and 
d. Refund all taxes paid . 
Arguments in the case have not been heard. 
Arguments To Overturn The Assessment System 
The following is a simplified summary of the arguments made 
by plaintiffs in the three cases to support their claims that 
Proposition 13's assessment provisions are invalid: 




against recent property owners in favor of long-time 
property owners, thus violating the equal protection clause 
of the California and U.S. Constitutions. 
2) Proposition 13's assessment system is indistinguishable a 
from the Webster County, West Virginia system which was 
recently invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
3) Similar properties situated side by side have as much as a 
15 to 1 disparity in assessed value under Proposition 13. 
Assuming the same rate of growth in assessed value over the 
next 10 years, by 1999 the disparity in assessed value for 
similarly situated properties may be as much as 100 to 1. 
4) Recent property owners bear a disproportionately greater 
property tax burden than do long-time owners who are 
similarly situated. This is in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the California and u.s. Constitutions. 
Arguments To Sustain The Assessment System 
The following is a simplified summary of the arguments made 
by defendants in the three cases to support their claims that 
Proposition 13's assessment provisions are valid: 
1) The equal protection clause of the California and U.S. 
Constitution protects people, not property. Proposition 13 
treats people fairly because people who pay the same amount 





2) The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Allegheny does not 
affect Proposition 13 because West Virginia's Constitution, 
unlike California's, requires property to be taxed in 
proportion to its current market value. Proposition 13 
taxes property in proportion to its acquisition value. 
3) The Allegheny decision does not apply because Webster 
County, unlike California, did not provide a rational, 
policy basis for its taxation scheme. Proposition 13 is 
the result of a deliberate and articulated policy choice. 
4) Disparities in the tax assessment of similarly situated 
properties were envisioned by both the framers and those 
who voted for Proposition 13. This disparity, in and of 
itself, does not violate the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution if it has a rational basis. 
5) The California Supreme Court has specifically upheld 
Proposition 13 against an equal protection challenge. 
6) The plaintiffs bear a smaller tax burden than those who 
purchased property after them. With the passage of time, 
plaintiff's share of the tax burden will grow 
disproportionately smaller than the most recent property 





HOW A HOME IS ASSESSED UNDER PROPOSITION 13 
o If a horne (which has not changed 
ownership or had new 
construction) has an assessed 
value of $50,000 in 1978 and is 
located in a county where the tax 
rate is 1.05%, its property tax 
bill will be $525. 
0 If in the following year (1979) 
the inflation factor is 2%, the 
horne's assessed value will be 
$51,000. Its new tax bill will 
be $535.50. 
o Assuming a new wing with a market 
value of $10,000 is added to the 
horne in 1980 and the inflation 
factor is 2%, the tax liability 
will be $651.21. 
This figure is computed by first 
finding the property's new 
adjusted base year value of 
$52,020 and then computing the 
tax bill as if the new 
construction had not occurred, 
which is $546.21. Property tax 
on the new wing is computed 
separately and added to the tax 
on the old structure. The new 
wing's tax is $105; therefore, 
the total property tax bill is 
$651.21. 
o If the property is sold on July 
1, 1983 for $175,000--which 
becomes its new base year 
value--the tax will be $1,837.50. 
-16-
Calculations 
$ 50 1 000 assess. value 
x .0105 tax rate 
$ 525.00 tax liability 
$ 50,000 assess. value 
X 1.0200 2% inflation 
$ 51,000 new value 
X .0105 tax rate 
$ 535.50 tax liability 
$ 51,000 assess. value 
X 1.0200 2% inflation 
$ 52,020 new value 
X .Q105 tax rate 
$ 546.21 pre-wing tax 
$ 10,000 value of wing 
X .Q105 tax rate 
$ 105.00 tax on wing 
s 546.21 pre-wing tax 
+ lOS.OQ tax on wing 
s 651.21 tax liability 
$175,000 new value 
x .Ql05 tax rate 
$1837.50 tax liability 
• 
CHAPTER 2 







Chapter 2 discusses pending lawsuits which challenge not 
Proposition 13 itself, but rather one of the most important 
statutes implementing Proposition 13. This group of lawsuits 
seeks to overturn AB 8, the major statute which determines'how 
property tax proceeds under Proposition 13 are distributed 
among counties, cities, special districts, and school 
districts. 
This litigation addresses allocation of property tax 
revenue arising from the countywide one percent property tax 
rate. Revenues raised from add-on tax rates levied to pay for 
voter-approved indebtedness are not at issue in these cases. 
Background: Allocation of Property Tax Revenues Before 
Proposition 13 
Until the 1978-79 fiscal year--that is, before Proposition 
13 took effect--cities, counties, special districts and school 
districts in California all were authorized to levy their own 
tax rates. The governing board of each local agency would 
adopt a tax rate by ordinance annually. 
These rates were expressed as so many cents per $100 of 
assessed value of property. Tax rates in a hypothetical 
community in the late 1970's might have been $0.75 levied by 
the county, $0.80 levied by the city, $1.10 levied by the 




the area. Therefore, the total tax rate applying to properties 
within the boundaries of these four agencies would have been 
the sum of their rates, $3.15 per $100 of assessed valuation 
(here expressed in terms of the current 100% assessment ratio 
rather than the previous 25% assessment ratio.) 
Prior to Proposition 13, the county tax collector sent a 
tax bill to each property in the county, billing the property 
owner for the tax arising from the sum total of all the 
property tax rates levied by the local agencies serving the 
property. These tax proceeds were then divided and returned by 
the county auditor to each of the local agencies in the county, 
in proportion to the tax rates each agency levied. 
Therefore, before Proposition J3 each local agency had the 
authority to determine how much property tax revenue it would 
collect each year. It exercised this authority by applying a 
tax rate to the assessed value of properties within its 
boundaries. The tax rate each property owner paid was the sum 
total of all the rates levied by the several local agencies 
serving his property. The revenue arising from each agency's 
tax rate was tracked and allocated directly to that agency for 
expenditure. 
What Proposition 13 Provided 
One of the key provisions of Proposition 13 was the 
placement of a cap on the total property tax rate that could 





13 the combined tax rate paid to all local agencies by 
California property owners averaged about three percent of 
assessed value, Proposition 13 limited the countywide tax rate 
to one percent of assessed value. 
For practical purposes, Proposition 13 also did away with 
the authority of local agencies to set and levy their own tax 
rates. Rather, the initiative established a single countywide 
tax rate of one percent and required the Legislature to put in 
place a mechanism for allocating the proceeds of this 
countywide rate to the various agencies within each county. 
This is the language adopted by the voters in Section 1(a) 
of Article XIIIA of the Constitution: 
The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real 
property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of 
the full cash value of such property. The one 
percent (1%) to be collected by the counties and 
apportioned according to law to the districts 
within the counties. 
How Proposition 13 Was Implemented By AB 8 of 1979 
In the aftermath of Proposition 13, the Legislature first 
enacted a one-year, short-term implementation program referred 
to as SB 154, which applied to the 1978-79 fiscal year. The 
following year it enacted AB 8, which was a comprehensive, 
long-term implementation of the initiative. Both these pieces 




Proposition 13's implementation. The paragraphs below describe 
in simplified terms the provisions of AB 8 which address 
allocation of the proceeds of the countywide one percent 
property tax rate. 
The Policy Underlying AB 8. The dilemma the Legislature 
faced was to divide up the proceeds of a much smaller property 
tax "pie" to all local agencies in each county. The goal was 
to do this in a way which shared the reduction among them 
equitably and would, over the long-term, respond flexibly and 
fairly to growth and development within each county. 
The path the Legislature chose in implementing Proposition 
13 was to make a one-time distribution of property tax revenues 
in 1979-80, which became a "base" for all future years, and 
then to provide a procedure for allocating future increases in 
property tax revenues arising from growth and development 
(called "increment"). 
How AB 8 Works. Under AB 8, the amount each local agency 
receives in property tax revenues each year is a combination of 
the calculation of its "base" revenues and its "increment." 
This is how the two components of the allocation system 
work: 
Base. The 1979-80 "base" amount of property tax revenue 
which each agency receives was originally determined in two 
steps. 
First, property tax revenues from Proposition 13's first 





agencies. Because Proposition 13 reduced the countywide 
tax rate from an average of just under three percent to one 
percent and reduced property assessments, property tax 
revenues were about $5 billion less statewide than they had 
been in the prior year. This smaller "pie" was allocated 
to local agencies in proportion to the average share of 
county property tax revenues each received in the three 
years preceding Proposition 13. 
Second, additional amounts of property taxes were added 
to the allocations for each city, county and special 
district based on block grants made to those age~cies in 
the first-year (1978-79) emergency implementation of 
Proposition 13 by SB 154. (These additional amounts of 
property tax revenue were available to allocate to cities, 
counties and special districts because property tax funding 
of schools was substantially reduced and replaced by state 
General Fund financing of local school districts, with 
minimum school revenue guarantees.) 
The combination of these two amounts became the 1979-80 
"base" amount of property tax revenues to which every local 
agency was entitled. In this way, the entire amount of the 
new smaller pot of property tax revenues under Proposition 
13 was allocated among local agencies. Each year, local 
agencies are guaranteed to receive this "base" amount of 




Increment. The second part of the AB 8 system 
determines how property tax revenues arising from growth 
and development after 1978-79 are to be allocated to local 
agencies. These new revenues from growth are called 
"increment." Specifically, increment is growth in property 
tax payments resulting from the following features of 
Proposition 13's assessment system: 1) the annual two 
percent increase in assessment, 2) the increases due to new 
construction, and 3) the increases due to changes in 
ownership. 
AB 8 provides that ''increment" is to be distributed to 
local agencies on a situs basis, that is, based on the 
geographic location of the properties whose value had 
grown. 
Because this is a situs-based system, county assessors 
and auditors must keep track of properties within very 
small geographic cells. These are called Tax Rate Areas 
(TRAs). A TRA is an area in which all parcels are served 
by the exact same mix of local agencies. 
Chart 1 below contains a simplified schematic example of 
how a county would be divided into TRAs. In the example in 
Chart 1, TRA #1 is served by the County and City A; TRA #2 
is served by the County, City A, and the Special District; 
TRA #3 is served by the County and the Special District; 

























AB 8 provides that when pro?erty values increase within 
a particular TRA, only the local agencies serving that TRA 
will receive the additional property tax revenues. AB 8 
also provides how the additional revenues are to be 
allocated among those agencies: the increment is allocated 
within TRAs by formula in proportion to each agency's 
average share of property tax revenues in the TRA in the 
three years preceding Proposition 13. This is the same 
formula approach as was used for allocation of the "base" 
portion of the property tax. 
Therefore, incremental revenues are allocated by a 




location of the growth, and then among the local agencies 
which serve the area by formula based on historical share 
of the property tax. 
AB 8 Recap 
In sum, then, AB 8 put into place a complex system of 
allocating property tax revenues by formula. The formula is a 
hybrid which allocates revenues to local agencies each year 
partially in relation to their pre-Proposition 13 local fiscal 
position and partially in relation to the location and value 
of growth since 1978-79. The pre-Proposition 13 fiscal 
position of a local agency affects its current share of 
property tax revenues in both the "base'' and "increment" 
portions of the AB 8 allocation system. Unlike the 
pre-Proposition 13 system, the AB 8 formulas can produce 
shifting of revenues among local agencies within a county. 
The Case of No-Property-Tax Cities 
A category of local government agencies affected in a 
rather extreme way by AB 8 is the so-called "no-property-tax 
cities" (and their cousins, "low-property-tax cities''). These 
are cities which levied no city property tax (or a very low 
tax rate, in the case of the "lows") prior to the enactment of 
Proposition 13. 
Because AB 8 formulas provide that allocations of property 






no-property-tax cities now receive no allocations of revenue 
from the one percent rate. Even though residents of tl1ese 
cities pay the same one percent tax rate as residents of other 
areas of the county, their city governments do not receive a 
share of those tax payments. A similar but less extreme 
situation occurs with low-property-tax cities, which receive 
small allocations of revenues. This result wad consistent 
with the original goals of AB 8, because AB 8 was designed to 
share the post-Proposition 13 property tax revenues among 
local governments which levied property taxes immediately 
before Proposition 13. 
In 1987 and 1988, the Legislature enacted legislation 
which modified AB 8 by requiring counties to shift portions of 
their property tax allocations to certain low- and 
no-property-tax cities. These shifts are to occur over a 
7-year phase-in period, and are beginning to be made in 
1989-90. 
Current Court Challenges to The Allocation System 
Three lawsuits have been filed to date challenging the 
property tax allocation system enacted by AB 8. Each case has 
been filed by a local government agency, and the defendants 
are either other local agencies or the state, or both. 
Although individual taxpayers are named as plaintiffs in 
one of these suits, these basically are disputes between local 




The cases vary according to characteristics of the local 
agencies filing the actions, and the legal arguments brought 
to bear are somewhat different. However, all three have the 
common feature of challenging the'constitutional validity of 
the way current law allocates property tax revenues from the 
countywide one percent rate among cities, counties, special 
districts, and school districts. 
The cases are as follows: 
1) Countx of San Diego v. Controller of the State of 
California 
In this lawsuit, San Diego County alleges that AB 
8 requires an unfairly large proportion of property 
tax collections in San Diego County to be allocated 
to schools. This allows the state to provide a 
relatively smaller subsidy to San Diego County 
schools than it provides in other counties, San Diego 
County argues, while denying the county government of 
property tax revenues to which it is entitled. 
2) City of Rancho Mirage v. County of Riverside 
The City of Rancho Mirage is a no-property-tax 
city. In this lawsuit, the city argues that because 
the AB 8 allocation formula is based on the amount of 
property taxes levied by a local agency prior to 
Proposition 13, no-property-tax cities like Rancho 
Mirage are unfairly penalized by being denied any 





their citizens pay the same tax rate as citizens 
living elsewhere in the county. In addition, the 
city argues that this feature of AB 8 denies the 
city's citizens the opportunity to take advantage of 
the tax relief provisions of Article XIIIB, the 
appropriations limit. 
3) City of Rancho Cucamonga( et. al. v. Counties of San 
Bernardino and Los Angeles, et. al. 
This suit is filed by the Cities of Rancho 
Cucamonga, Temple City, Compton, El Segundo, and 
Carson against the Counties of Los Angeles and San 
Bernardino and the Cities of Los Angeles and 
Redlands. 
The plaintiff cities in the case are either 
no-property-tax or low-property-tax cities. They are 
members of the Contract Cities Association, which is 
sponsoring this lawsuit. 
Like the Rancho Mirage case, this lawsuit argues 
that the AB 8 system unfairly shifts property taxes 
away from historically "frugal" cities and benefits 
historically "spendthrift" cities within any given 
county. This results in harm to taxpayers, the 
plaintiffs argue, because their tax dollars are being 
exported to finance services to citizens of other 
communities. 
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All three cases are currently at the Superior Court level, 
and none have been argued. Some of the parties have suggested 
consolidating the three cases into one. 
Summary of Arguments to Overturn The Allocation System 
The following is a simplified summary of the points made 
by plaintiffs in the three cases, arguing that the AB 8 system 
is invalid: 
1) AB 8 is unfair, because it allocates property tax proceeds 
without regard for who paid them, allowing property tax 
proceeds to cross jurisdictional lines within a county. 
2) It violates the "tax situs" requirements of the California 
Constitution, because taxpayers are not getting the 
benefit of services from their tax dollars. In some 
cases, citizens are "paying twice" for services, since the 
city must levy other taxes or fees to replace property tax 
revenue it is not receiving. 
3) AB 8 is discriminatory and violates the equal protection 
clauses of the California and United States Constitutions 
because: (a) historically low-tax cities are hurt 
vis-a-vis historically high-tax cities, and (b) cities 
incorporated after Proposition 13 are allowed to share in 
the property tax while low-tax cities existing before 






4) The "home rule" provisions of the California Constitution 
are violated. These give charter cities the right to 
control their own municipal and fiscal affairs. AB 8 
violates this by preventing cities from levying their own 
property tax rates. 
5) AB 8 violates the "uniformity" provision of the state 
Constitution, which requires uniform taxation for owners 
of like property. This occurs because a higher 
county-government tax rate is imputed to property owners 
in cities where lower revenues are allocated to city 
government. This results in property owners in different 
areas of the county paying different county-government tax 
rates even though they receive the same county services. 
6) The results of the AB 8 system have harmed the plaintiff 
cities' abilities to provide essential public services and 
solve pressing municipal problems. 
7) Even if the provisions of AB 8 were initially justif by 
the emergency resulting from adoption of Proposition 13, 
that emergency no longer exists and conditions have 
changed markedly in the decade since that time. By 
contrast, the inequities wrought by AB 8 will get worse 
over time. 
8) Cities which have had property tax revenues shifted away 
from them are denied the opportunity to give tax relief to 
their residents under Article XIIIB of the California 




the return to taxpayers of revenues the 
governmental agency's annual appropriations limit. 
Summary of Arguments to Sustain Allocation System • 
It is difficult to provide a complete summary of arguments 
defendants will use to defend the validity of AB 8, because 
defendants' answers filed in the courts to date have primarily 
denied the charges made by plaintiffs and set forth procedural 
objections. 
Some of the general responses made by defendants include: 
sufficient facts have not been presented to constitute a cause 
of action; the action is barred by statutes of limitation; 
defendants were acting in accordance with state law in 
implementing the allocation system; the complaints contain 
defects and misjoinders of parties; and others. 
Based on conversations with representatives of the 
defendants, it is expected that some of the more specific 
es they will make in defending the validity of AB 8 
will include: 
1) AB 8 does not violate the "home rule'' provisions of the 
Constitution. When the California Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of Proposition 13 in the Amador 
Valley case in 1979 (see Chapter 1), SB 154 had already 
been enacted. SB 154 formed the basis for AB 8. The 
Supreme Court took the SB 154 revenue allocation scheme 






2) AB 8 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the 
United States or California Constitutions. In matters of 
taxation, the courts allow the Legislature great leeway so 
long as there' is a rational basis for differences in tax 
burdens. In the case of AS 8, the Legislature distributed 
a drastically-reduced property tax "pie" among the local 
government entities which had levied property taxes prior 
to Proposition 13. Further, under AS 8, revenue growth 
from new development is distributed on a situs basis. 
This is a rational basis for the current allocation 
system. 
3) There are no violations of "tax situs" principles, because 
property tax revenues produced from properties within a 
county remain with that county. AB 8 does not permit 
transfer of property tax revenues across county 
boundaries. 'rhe "tax situs" principles apply within 
county boundaries, not within sub-county boundaries. 
4) While plaintiffs point out the transfers of property tax 
revenues away from them, they fail to acknowledge that 
reverse transfers also occur. That is, plaintiffs benefit 
from aspects of the AS 8 formulas which shift property tax 
revenues from other cities to the plaintiff cities. 
5) Plaintiffs fail to take into account other complicated 
features of local government financing which bear on the 
fairness of the AB 8 allocation system. Examples include: 
(a) statutes which rermit some ci' .. Lc?s, but not others, to 
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levy property taxes to pay for pension systems 1 (b) 
different levels of property taxes to 
redevelopment agencies in different c , and (c 
fact that in some counties contract cities are not 
general overhead costs for county services 1 which are 
for from general county funds, contributed to by all 
county taxpayers. 
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